To support the human factors engineer in designing a good interactive system, a method has been developed to analyze the empirical data of the interactive decision behavior described in a finite discrete state space. The sequences of decisions and actions produced by users contain much information about their mental models, the individual problem solution strategy for a given task and the underlying decision structure. We distinguish between (1) the logical structure (the 'device model'), (2) the sequenrial goal structure, and (3) the temporal structure. The analyzing tool AMME can handle the recorded decision and action sequences and automatically extracts a net description of the task dependent decision model (the logical structure). This basic model is extended by further elements to reconstruct an empirical expert user sequence. This article presents two modeling strategies:
INTRODUCTION
What mental models are and how they work, is quite unclear. Carroll and Reitman-Olson ... (11) Expand the task domain to more complex software" ([2] pp. [59] [60] [61] . In this paper we present a modeling approach that contributes to points (l), (3), (4), (5), (7), (10) and (1 1). W e are primarily interested in a bottom-up, behavior driven and not in a topdown, theory driven approach.
Most of the known modeling approaches are based on the assumption that the "mental model maps completely to the relevant part of the conceptual model, e.g. the user virtual machine. Unexpected effects and errors point to inconsistency between the mental model and the conceptual model" ( [16] p. 258). This one-to-one mapping between the mental model and the conceptual model of the interactive system implies a positive correlation between the complexity of the observable behavior and the complexity of the assumed mental model. But this assumption seems to be wrong.
Based on the empirical result in [12] , that the complexity of the observable behavior of novices is larger than the complexity of experts, we must conclude that the behavioral complexity is negatively correlated with the complexity of the mental model. If the cognitive structure is too simple, then the concrete task solving process must be filled up with a lot of heuristics or trial and error behavior. Learning how to solve a specific task with a given system means that the behavioral complexity decreases and the cognitive complexity increases. Now, one of the central question is: What kind of knowledge is stored in the cognitive structure? Before we are able to give a preliminary answer to this question, we have to introduce our complexity measure.
THE MEASUREMENT OF COMPLEXITY
The symbolic representation of the machine system consists of the following elements: 1. objects (things to operate on), 2. operations (symbols and their syntax), and 3. states (the 'system states'). The mental model of the user can be structured in representing: objects, operations, states, system structure, decision and task structure. A net can be described as a mathematical structure consisting of two non-empty disjoint sets of nodes (S-elements and T-elements), and a binary flow relation (F). Thefolding operation in the Petri-net theory is the basic idea of the approach presented in this paper. Folding a process means to map S-elements onto Selements and T-elements onto T-elements while keeping the F-structure. The result is the structure of the ptrformance net. Each state corresponds to a system context, and each transition corresponds to a system action. This sequence is called a 'process' (see Fig.1 ). An elenientary process is the shortest meaningful part of a sequence:
If the observable behavior can be recorded in a
process description (see Fig. l ), then the analysis and construction of the net structure of this process are simple: you only have to count the number of all different states and transitions used, or to mark on a list the frequencies of each state and transition used in the process.
However, if the observable behavior only can be recorded as an incomplete (e.g .,... The aim of the 'folding' operation is to reduce the elements of an observed empirical decision process to the minimum number of states and transitions, with the reduced number of elements being the 'logical decision structure'. Folding a decision process extracts the embedded net structure and neglects the amount of repetitions, the sequential order, and the temporal structure. A simple pattern matching algorithm looks for all 'elementary processes' in the sequence. A composition algorithm (the folding operation) is now able to build up the Petri net combining all elementary processes. The result of a folding operation applied to the behavioral sequence ( Fig. 1) is the Petri net given in Fig. 2 . 
net elements (T-transitions plus S-statcs).
The parameter P is a constant to correct the result of Formula 1 in the case of a sequence (F -(T + S) = -1); the value of P in our context is 1.
The CcyClc value of the model-] in Fig. 2 is [32-25+1=8] ; the complexity of the net shown in Fig. 2 Observing the behavior of people solving a specific probiem or task, is our basis for estimating 'model complexity (MC)'. The cognitive structures of users are not directly observable, so we need a method and a theory to use the observable behavior to estimate MC. We call the Complexity of the observable behavior the 'behavioral complexity'. This behavioral complexity can be estimated by analyzing the recorded concrete task solving process. The necessary task solving knowledge for a given task is constant. This knowledge embedded in the cognitive structure of the mental model can be reconstructed.
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MENTAL MODEL
We carried out an empirical investigation to compare different types of interfaces [lo] . For the reconstruction of a user's mental model we chose one log file of an expert user (see Fig. 1 ). The whole process of the shown example is based on 26 task solving transitions (user actions or automatic system actions) and overall 26+1=27 states (dialog or internal system states). The user's task was to find out how many data records there are in a given data base (DB) consisting of file A, file B and file C of a given database (DB Fig. 1 . The original behavioral sequence of an expert with a relational database system [lo] . Mental models consist of three different types of knowledge: (1) the pure logical structure of the task (the device model), (2) the sequential structure of all goals, and (3) the temporal structure of all actions. The pure logical structure is automatically extracted with our tool AMME [12] . This net is called model-1. Model-1 does not contain any knowledge about goals and time.
The content of the rule base (S-, T-, and F-rules) guiding the generation process of the 'cognitive part' of the mental model will be implemented in two ways: a) To generate models with event-driven goal setting processes (action-driven goal setting, resp.), and b) to generate models with parallel goal setting processes. Parallel goal setting means that the mental goal setting process is running parallel to the action level on which the dialog actions are executed.
The design rule of event-driven goal setting processes was motivated by the Action Regulation Theory [5] . Action regulation theory offers a coherent body of principles for human-centered task and work design. For Hacker ([6] , p. 61) the work task is "the central category of psychological consideration of activity ..., as decisive specifications for the regulation and organisation of the activities occur with the 'objective logic' of its contents". This quotation makes clear that for all, who follow the activity or action regulation theory, the task becomes very important in the analysis of behavior. Great importance is attached to the concept of the complete task. Each complete task and action cycle starts with a goal setting part (see Fig. 8 ).
Characteristics of complete tasks, which must be taken into consideration when analysing andor designing human activities, are, according to the concept of action regulation theory presented here (see Fig. 8 ):
Task dependent setting of subgoals which are embedded in the superimposed task goal;
Independent action preparation in the sense of taking on planning functions; and, selection of the means including the necessary actions for goal attainment;
Mental or physical performance functions with feedback on performance pertaining to possible corrections of actions;
Control with feedback on results and the possibility of checking the. results of one's own actions against the set (sub-)goals. Our event-driven goal setting example is model-2 (see Fig. 2 ). Each action (event, resp.) generates the goal for the next action . The mental process of the user takes place at the cognitive level. The user interacts with the system level. The goals at the goal instanciation level are set from the cognitive level as well as from the system level. There is a direct synchronization between the: action level and the two upper ones, cognitive and system level.
The idea of a parallel goal setting process was motivated by von Cranach's discussion of plans, 'antici-pating representations', and intention (131 p. 40). The transitions in the cognitive layer of Fig. 3 are a mental process. For each goal at the goal instanciation level to be set, an anticipated counterpart must be set beforehand on the cognitive level. In this process there is no synchronization between the cognitive (or system) and the action level.
In the last part of this article, model-], model-2 and model-3 are going to be empirically validated. To validate the three different mental models, a simulation study was carried out. With the Petri-net simulator PACE each of our three models was implemented, marked and executed. We generated different task solving sequences with each model. When running each model, we used the following stopping conditions:
For model-1, we ran the model until we entered the (Start menu) a fourth time.
For model-2 and model-3 we ran the models until the Petri nets were dead.
To estimate the similarity between the original sequence (see Fig. 1 ) and each simulated sequence, we used the following procedure:
1. We numbered consecutively all actions ('transitions', respectively) in Fig. 1 3. We calculated a 'similarity ratio' (SR) as follows:
SR is a sufficient measure for the similarity between the simulated sequence and the original sequence. N is the number of all fired transitions in a sequence. The maximum of Rorg is equal to Nare (NOrg in Fig. 1 is 26) . SR is only valid for simulated sequences that fulfill the following condition: N,,, I Norg. For example, SR of the shortest sequence ['l', '19','25', '26'1 is 6%. 4. We averaged the similarity ratios of all simulated sequences per model (see Table 1 ). The results in Table 1 show that with increasing complexity of the mental model (MC), the similarity ratio (SR) tends to 100%. There seems to be a positive correlation between MC and SR and we can also see that the variance (measured by the standard deviation) decreases continually with increasing MC.
This result indicates that the predictive power increases from model-1 to model-3.
DISCUSSION
In the original sequence, there is a cyclic behavior. The user tried twice to see the task relevant information, but without success. The third time, he found the right buttons, and succeeded. This is a typical learning effect. Simulation of learning with Petri nets was achieved with other strategies 1141.
Learning seems to be difficult to simulate with eventdriven goal setting, because repeated behavior cannot be integrated in the modeling. For the parallel goal setting approach though, repeated behavior is reflected in the model, with improved results from one to the next repetition. However, since there is no synchronization between the cognitive and the action level for the parallel goal setting approach, the similarity is still less than 100%.
Both the methods have good and poor aspects: Eventdriven goal setting assures good synchronization.
Although the knowledge about how to solve part of the requirements is included in the model, it tells nothing about a learning effect, neither by inspection of the Petri net nor by looking at a trace. The parallel goal setting approach supports a learning effect, which can be seen by looking to the model-3. An integration of the advantages from each of the two strategies will be a possible target for our further research.
We have to choose a stop criteria for model-1. The reason is that the simulations with this model never stopped before reaching N,,rg number of transitions.
We looked for characteristics in the original behavioral sequence to find a distinctive pattern of state(s) andor transition(s). We settled on the number of times a simulation passes by the state (Start menu). When a simulation of model-1 comes the fourth time to the state (Start menu), this means that the simulation stops. This led to the results shown in Table 1 .
CONCLUSION
We can conclude from the validation results that the SR value is considerably higher for the models with added goal setting (model-2 and model-3) than for the pure logical structure (model-] ). This justifies the idea of adding a goal setting structure to the logical one. So it seems to be possible to develop a completely automatic modeling tool based on a bottom up approach. Moreover, we see that with increasing m o d e l complexity (MC), the mean value of SR increased and the standard deviation got smaller. C o m p a r i n g t h e t w o different m o d e l i n g approaches, parallel goal setting performed better than event-driven goal setting. We were able t o m o d e l learning effccts with the parallel goal setting strategy.
